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FEDERAL REGULATION OF FALSE ADVERTISING
George ,. Alexander*

The federal government regulates falsity in advertising in a number of
ways. Several governmental agencies are involved in the process: The Food
and Drug Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Post Office to mention only a few. Except for the Federal Trade Commission,
however, no agency has authority over all of the many forms of false advertis
ing. The others are limited to their own subject matter areas or to a particular
mode of transmission of information.1 The Federal Trade Commission, on
the other hand, has broad statutory authority to prohibit "unfair methods of
competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce . ..."2
The Commission was founded in 1914 and has, almost from the beginning,
divided its functions into two principal areas: the regulation of restraints of
trade, and the regulation of false advertising.3 In both fields, the Commission
has taken its authority quite seriously. In its pronouncements concerning false
advertising, it has made clear that Commission intervention is not to be limited
merely to cases in which large segments of the population are probably misled,
but may be invoked where a substantial segment of the population might be
victimized.! Furthermore, the latter group need not even be comprised of
average citizens. The cases continually speak of protecting the credulous and
less intelligent members of the consuming public. One commissioner has ex
pressed the fear that the Commission might find itself protecting the Mortimer
Snerds of our society/i and Judge Augustus Hand solemnly pronounced that
the Commission could anticipate the millenium by protecting the wandering
man, though fool, of whom the prophet Isaiah spoke.a Protection of the easily
deceived has been a goal of the Commission ever since.
It is fairly easy to make oneself look foolish in this business of protecting
fools, and the Commission has certainly done so a number of times. In 1944,
the Commission became concerned about false indications of origin on
products. In one of several cases, the Commission thought that the name
"New Bedford" on a rug made in Belgium might be deceptive.7 In an attempt
to substantiate its suspicions, it sent out a questionnaire to an unspecified num
ber of people listed in the New York telephone directory and requested that
• Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Syracuse University College of Law. A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1959,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.M. 1964, Yale. This article was delivered, in substance, at the State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School on October 24, 1968.
1 See generally, Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLUM. 1. REV. 1018 (1956).
"Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
aG. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION, 1-48 (1924).
• That there be at least a substantial number of persons endangered seems an accepted limitation on
the Commission's solicitude toward trusting buyers. Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
• Independent Directory Corp., 47 F.T.C. 13, 31 (1950) (dissenting opinion), aU'd and
' enforced, 188
F 2d 468 (2d Cir. 1951).
"General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F 2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. detlied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941).
'Stephen Rug Mills, 34 F.T.C. 958 (1942), aU'd stlb nom., Herzfeld v. FTC, 140 F 2d 207 (2d Cir.
1944).
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each answer a series of questions. Included was the following: "If hooked
rugs were identified or described to you by the name glven below, would you
or would you not, from those names, form any opinior.. or gain impression as
to the country where they were made? If you would not, please write 'No' [in
the answer] otherwise please insert the name of the country . . ."8 Although
the Commission did not indicate how many of these questionnaires it sent out,
thirty-eight were returned. Sixteen of the respondents indicated that the name
"New Bedford" gave them no impression as to where the rug was manu
factured. Twenty-two thought the name indicated domestic manufacture,
whereupon the Commission solemnly found that the name was deceptive.9
The questionnaire failed to mention that at the bottom of the label containing
the name "New Bedford" was printed, in almost identical size, the words
"Made in Belgium." According to the Commission, that made no difference,
since once an advertisement was determined to be false, inconsistent qualifying
language was not relevant. 10
The Commission has never been able to develop a consistent policy as to
what the adjective "free" means to a credulous consumer. At times, the Com
mission has concluded that that word invokes such avarice in the hearts of the
consumer that even when goods are in fact given without additional charge in
connection with other purchases, the word is deceptive ,11 At other times, the
Commission has permitted the word to be used so long as no hidden charges
would make the supposedly gratuitous product in fa.ct one for which the
.customer has paid. 12 Between these two positions similar problems arose in
interpretation. The whole matter eventually became so complex that one of
the current commissioners, not noted for his intemperance in decision, wrote
the following:
.

[H]ow will a lawyer answer a client who asks: "May I advertise something
'free' to purchasers who buy another article at the stated price, if the advertisement

. clearly discloses all of the terms and conditions of the dIer?"

The only safe

answer would seem to be: "I do�'t know. I've read all of th� Commission opinions
on the subject, and I still don't know. What's more, I don't think the Commis

sion knows."18

34 F.T.C. at 966.
Even a bare majority was not necessary since the Commission has taken the position that sufficient
consumer deception is indicated when a substantial percentage of those reporting indicate their misunder
standing. Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
10
No mention was made in the entire questionnaire of the "Made in Bel{:ium " indication.
11 In Book-of-the-Month-Club, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 1 297 (1952), petition to s�t aside order denied, 202 F 2d
486 (2d Cir.) cert. dismissed, 346 U.s. 883 (1953), Chairman James M. Mead was driven to analogizing
the use of the word with an illegal lottery. At 48 F.T.C. 1313 Chairmaa Mead quoted from a lottery
case, Rase II. Van Demann & Lewis, 240 u.s. 342 (1916):
[T]hey rely on something else than the article sold. They tempt by a promise of a value greater
than that article and apparently not represented in its price, and it lienee may be thought that
thus by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence. This may not be called . . _ gaming; it may,
however, be considered as having the seduction and evil of such
11
Samuel Stores, Inc., 27 F.T.C. 882 (1938).
13 Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T_C. 1827, 1866 (1962), rell'd, 333 F.:�d 654 (5th Cir. 1964), rell'd,
382 U.S_ 46 (1965).
8

9

.

.

.

•
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" In another case,where the Commission decided that a medication did not
live up to its promoter's claim of drying up pimples,· despite evidence to the
contrary at the hearing,and despite a contrary ruling of the hearing examiner
who recommended dismissing the complaint, the court of appeals severely
restricted the FTC's order.14 The court said, in a terse opinion,that the Com
mission was wrong and, besides, it was "making a mountain out of a
pimple.»lll
The appearance of foolishness is,in my judgment,the least of the Commis
sion's faults. A second, and more serious fault, is the Commission's single
minded devotion to its task of driving from the market place cheats and
frauds. In the history of FTC cases,one finds almost no weighing of compet
ing interests. Indeed, one looks in vain for the suggestion that competing
interests even exist. This is a strange business indeed. It is especially curious
since the same commissioners, reviewing antitrust cases, have made it clear
in several decisions that they recognize the competitive impact of advertising.16
Recently in the Proctor and Gamble-Clorox merger case,1 7 the Commission
argued at length how advertising could be used by Proctor and Gamble further
to reduce competition in the chlorine bleach market. Proctor and Gamble's ad
vertising budget was many times that of Clorox's though Clorox had already
been able to achieve a price substantially higher on what the Commission
found to be chemically identical chlorine bleach, presumably through adver
tising promotion distinguishing Clorox from other brands of chlorine bleach.
The forces which immunized Clorox from the competition of other sellers
of bleach would,the Commission felt,be enhanced by the increased advertising
budget available after the merger. New entry would be discouraged for the
same reasons and, in general, the market would move toward even greater
concentration.ls It apparently did not occur to the Commission that the reason
that Clorox had been so effective in outdistancing its competition in chlorine
bleach was because it was a false advertiser. If, as the Commission found, its
bleach was identical with other bleaches and its advertising had indicated, as
indeed it still does, that Clorox bleach was different from and superior to its
competitors, then it seems that the Commission was remiss in allowing the
advertising to continue.
If the Commission has not moved to eliminate abuses in the advertising
industry such as those described above, it at least should not assist this form
of consumer deception. In fact, however, it has. In the mid-thirties, for ex
ample, a group of coal producers determined to promote their coal by calling
it "New River Coal." This was not a trademark, since it belonged to no
single producer,and was independent of the corporate names of the producers.
H Kleerex Co., 46 F. T.C. 898 ( 1950), modified sub nom. Folds v. F TC, 187 F.2d 658 (7th Cit.
1951 ).
16 Folds v. FTC, 187 F 2d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 1951).
"'FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); General Foods Corp. v. F TC, 386 F.2d 936
(3rd Cir. 1967).
17 FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
18 rd. at 580-81.
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It was merely an attempt to identify the coal being promoted. Another seller,
selling coal which apparently was identical in quality and came from the same
geographic coal bed, also called his coal "New River Coal" to indicate that
consumers could use it interchangeably. The Commission ordered him to cease
and desist from so deceiving the public. 19 Logically extended to the bleach
case, such reasoning would prohibit other bleach manJfacturers from selling
their product as "chlorine bleach" if Clorox had done so first. Unwarranted
product differentiation was in this case not only allowed, but enforced.
In another case,20 the Commission was asked to comider whether a promo
tional campaign by the Chevrolet Division of General Motors for the sale of
its replacement parts was deceptive. The Division had encouraged consumers
to buy genuine Chevrolet parts and had asserted that "Your Chevrolet knows
the difference.,,2 1 Deception was alleged because a number of the parts to
which the cars were alleged to react differently were parts manufactured not
by Chevrolet but by other companies, and a good number of them were sold
in identical form (without, of course, the Chevrolet trademark) to competing
sellers of replacement parts. Clearly, the difference between these parts and
genuine Chevrolet replacement parts was nil. The Commission concluded,
however, that there was no actionable deception and d:lsmissed the complaint.
A final example of unwarranted product differentiation by the Commission
may be found in the litigation surrounding the advertising of chamois cloth.
When the natural source of chamois cloth began to diminish, a substitute was
developed from sheepskin which the Commission permitted to be advertised
as "chamois."22 When a different method of tanning sheepskin was developed,
however, the Commission prohibited calling the product "chamois" on the
ground that it was not identical with the already approved form of making
what appeared to be a functionally almost identical product.2 3 Since neither
name accurately described the traditional process for mlking chamois, it is not
clear why the Commission preferred the first over the sl�cond. It becomes even
murkier when one recognizes that, contemporaneously with the decision the
federal government was purchasing type-one and type-two chamois, one
number being assigned to each of the two processes. Fi:lally, as the respondent
in one of the cases pointed out, since there were only four producers of the
approved chamois in the United States, what the Commission was effectively
doing was granting to these four a monopoly in a product which really was
being produced by a number of others as well.. The Commission cynically
responded: "The order does not reject respondents' products. They may still
sell their products so long as they do not sell under the name 'chamois.' ,,24
The chamois litigation was an outgrowth of an earEer established Commis
sion policy. In the 1930's a species of wood produced on the west coast and
'·Walker's New River Mining Co., 18 F.T.C. 176 (1934).
,., General Motors Corp., 53 F.T.C. 1239 (1957) .
., [d. at 1242.
.. Pigro Chamois Co., 25 F.T.C. 929 (1937).
'" Atlantic Sponge & Chamois Corp., 52 F.T.C. 500 (1955).
"'[d. at 530.
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initially called yellow pine began to compete in the east where white pine
had an established market. The wood was by that time commonly called
California white pine in the west. No one was greatly upset by that name
until both California white pine and eastern white pine became available to
the same group of customers. When it did, the producers of the eastern pine
complained to the Commission of the falsity they thought inherent in calling
the California wood a species of white pine. Actually the western manu�
facturers were not without a rational explanation for the use of the name. The
wood was not demonstrably inferior to the eastern pine in its uses, and the
name had been adopted in California without any apparent deceptive intent.
Furthermore, the Bureau of Standards had recognized the name "California
white pine" as a legitimate description of the wood. The litigation25 was
hotly contested, and ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court
where the main argument made. on behalf of the California interest was the
argument of functional equivalence. The west coast producers also asserted
that the price of the California wood-lower than that of eastern white pine
made it a useful substitute in the eastern market. Justice Cardozo found, how�
ever, that the Commission had properly prohibited the use of the name "Cali�
fornia white pine." In one of the most important decisions in the law of
deceptive advertising, he wrote:
[The] saving to the consumer, though it be made out, does not obliterate the
prejudice. Fair competition is not attained by balancing a gain in money against a

misrepresentation of the thing supplied. The courts must set their faces against a

conception of business standards so corrupting in its tendency. The consumer is
prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied with something

else. In such matters, the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice
may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.26

This rationale was applied by the Commission in a wide range of cases to
prevent the use of the name, associated at one time with a certain product, on
another product differently produced or differently made. Thus, for a long
time, the Commission prohibited the use of "Sheffield plate" on silver plate
which had originally been made by brazing sterling silver to a copper base-a
process abandoned throughout the world, even in Sheffield, England-for
functionally similar products made by modern electroplating techniques.27
Similarly, it prohibited the use of the word "engraving" for any of the processes
developed subsequent to the traditional process of etching metal surfaces to
obtain a desired pattern. More significantly, the Commission prohibited as
well any reference to the product historically made differently in the descri�
tion of a new functionally�equivalent product.28 Consequently, it was found
deceptive to speak of a functionally�identical printed paper as having been
produced by "engraving," or "non�plate engraving," or "engraving without
Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
78.
.. Louis Badin, 9 F.T.C. 143 (1925).
'" FfC

'" Id.

f1Il

v.

at

Id.
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copper plates." It was likewise deceptive to refer to "Sheffield design reproduc
tion,,29 in a product manufactured through an electroplating process. In the
chamois cases the Commission prohibited any reference to chamois for the
type-two process. "Carpincho chamois cuts" for a process made from pig-like
carpincho hide was disallowed,so as were even such modestly stated titles as
chamois-like sheepskin and chamois-type sheepskin.s1 In other words, one
could sell a functionally similar or even equivalent chamois so long as he
neither called it "chamois" nor stated in the name that it was functionally
similar to chamois. The words that come to mind as useful in indicating a
functional similarity in a product differently made have, one by one, fallen
to Commission interdiction. For example, the Commission has held that to
refer to a product as a copy or reproduction of another product is deceptive
if the process by which it is copied or reproduced is less arduous than the
process originally employed.s2 A hand-woven oriental rug, therefore, may not
be machine reproduced and sold as a copy because the Commission has taken
the position that the handweaving must be copied as wen.aa
/ Justice Cardozo's opinion in the white pine case essentially defined the
goal of advertising regulation as the prevention of f.�ustration of consumer
,desires, irrespective of whether those desires were wellAounded.84 The Com
mission, on the other hand, seems completely indifferent to whether consumer
preferences in fact exist for a prior process and asserts instead that consumers
are entitled to receive their products through the historic production processes.
In the chamois litigation it was quite explicit on this pO:nt. The opinion noted,
"[ a] lthough the ordinary buyer does not know how I:hamois is made, he is
entitled to believe that the particular product sold under that name is in fact
�chamois' as that terms is understood by manufacturers and distributors."sli
Similarly, the Commission has looked to historic product distribution pat
terns to identify the sellers who may appropriately call themselves "retailers"
or "wholesalers" as well as those who may legitimately indicate that the prod
uct comes directly from the factory or is produced by the seller. Here again,
the Commission is not concerned with whether custom(:rs view a wholesaler as
primarily a person who gives them a wholesale price (although he sells a
substantial volume of products to ultimate consumers), or whether their
.. National Silver Co., 44 F.T.C. 1 (1947), modifying Samuel

E.

3ernstein, Inc., 10 F.T.C. 223

(1926).

Pigro Chamois Co., 25 F.T.C. 929 (1937).
'" Atlantic Sponge & Chamois Corp., 52 F.T.C. 500, 526. The first advisory opinion issued by the
Commission expressly forbade use of the terms "Chamois-like Sheepskin" and "Chamois-type Sheepskin. "
Adv. Op. No. 1 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REp. � 17,010 (F.T.C. 1964).
.. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 34 F.T.C. 1252 (1942).
00

ald.

�

.. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 29) U:S. 67, 78 (1934).
"" Atlantic Sponge & Chamois Corp., 52 F.T.C. 500, 531 (emphasis supplied).
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interests lies in identifying his precise distributive function. The Commission
opts in favor of the latter.36
The result of tying both product descriptions and distributive descriptions
to their historic meaning is to insulate historic manufacturing and distribution
patterns from the impact of functionally more desirable alternatives. The
competition of the new form of engraving would presumably make a more
substantial contribution to a better and cheaper process if its promoters could
emphasize to the consumer its functional equivalence with the older form.
Similarly, the fact that chamois was first produced from one process rather
than another does not guarantee that consumers might not prefer the second
at its price level to the product previously offered.
A similar reverence for tradition appears in the pricing cases. In Mary
Carter Paint CO.37 for example, the respondent traditionally sold paint through
a buy-one-get-one-free promotion. The Commission claimed that the price of
the second can was included in the price for the combination, and that, there
fore, . the use of the word "free" was deceptive. The company claimed that
the can of paint required to be purchased was functionally equivalent to com
parably priced paint. Thus, the second can of paint was in fact given without
additional charge. However, the Commission and the reviewing courts were
unpersuaded. In their judgment, functional equivalence had nothing to do
with it. Since Mary Carter had traditionally sold paints in this manner, they
reasoned, the second can was in fact figured in in the price of the combination.
Thus, it was not "free."
Putting aside questions of the meaning of the adjective "free," the unwill
ingness of the Commission to look to the prices of competitors and the insis
tence that the price structure be examined solely in terms of Mary Carter's
prior practice seems to disregard the information competitively most useful.
If one assumes, as Mary Carter Paint asserted, that paint could really be sold
of equal quality at half the current price, it is difficult to imagine any informa
tion of more potential use to the consumer in product differentiation, which
the Commission presumably desires to preserve. Even harder to understand
is the fact that the Commission would presumably allow any of Mary Carter's
competitors who had sold paint at twice the price to run a promotion of the
sort denied Mary Carter. For them, a two-for-the-price-of-one sale would be
legitimate because in terms of their historic pricing pattern two cans had
previously been sold for twice the price of one.
"" Wholesalers are defined in terms of the traditional role performed rather than the price advantage
that the use of the symbol is thought to represent. "A wholesaler ... is one who sells to a retailer or
jobber, usually in quantity lots, and not direct to the ultimate consumer of an individual unit." Progress
Tailoring Co., 37 F. T.C. 277, 290 (1943), aD'd, 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946). "A wholesaler .. . is
one who sells to the trade for resale and seldom, if ever, to the purchasing public, with the exception [of]
sales to industrial concerns, public utilities, banks and other similar organizations, which purchase in
quantity lots . .. not for resale. ..." L. & C. Mayers Co., 21 F.T.C. 434, 439 (1935), aD'd, 97 F.2d
365 (2d Cir. 1938).
"'Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T. C. 1827 (1962), ret/d, 333 F 2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 382
U.S. 46 (1965), modified order entered, TRADE REG. REP. � 17,660 (F.T.C. 1966).
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Fortunately, there is a philosophy abroad at the moment in Congress which
promises to alleviate a number of the conditions which the Commission has
either not touched or aggravated. Most notable of legi5lation along these lines
have been the recently passed Fair Packaging and Labeling Act3S and the
Truth-in-Lending Act.311 The former legislation is modest in its requirement
that consumer products indicate on their face an intelligible quantity descrip
tion, an identification of the product, and something 0 E the ingredients of the
product, and that quantity units be standardized in order to facilitate com
parison with competing brands. The latter act providl�s for full disclosure of
the terms and conditions of finance charges in credit transactions. The evident
thesis of this new legislation is that the consumer needs more intelligible
information in order rationally to choose between competing products. Gov
ernmental interdiction of falsity has been demonstrably insufficient in the past
and certainly cannot be wholly relied on in the future to prevent deception.
While he was Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Professor Donald
Turner suggested that disseminating information to consumers was a possible
solution to the present anti-competitive effects brought about by advertising.40
He found this approach more promising than any direct form of intervention
in advertising itself because he thought it too difficult to distinguish between
those advertisements which usefully inform and those which merely pro
Ihote.41 Perhaps indicative of his general antipathy to much of present ad
vertising was his suggestion that efficiencies in advertising should not be re
garded as justifications for mergers although efficiend�s in other areas might
well merit consideration.42 He spelled out in broad language the manner in
which advertising had established barriers to entry of new enterprise and led
toward greater concentration of industries already in tt.e market.43 During his
tenure, ho}¥ever, Professor Turner did not move to implement legislation
affecting his proposals for direct consumer information, and it is probable that
no such broad legislation will be enacted in the immediate future. If in fact
advertising does have a substantial anti-competitive effect) the most immediate
effective remedy, short of obtaining Congressional approval for new sources
of consumer information, would lie in revamping the present false advertising
policy of the Federal Trade Commission in an attempt to shift more of ad
vertising from the anti-competitive promotional type, which endeavors to sell
a product by disguising its functional identity with its competitors, to informa
tive advertising which sells products by giving consumers a valid reason for
preferring them. The latter form of advertising is, of course, essential to
intelligent consumer decisions.
Fair Packaging & Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966).
.. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
co Advertising and Competition, speech by Donald Turner, June 2, 1566, excerpted in 5 TRADE REG.
REP. � 50,162.
u Id. at 55,209.
"'!d. at 55,207.
"Id. at 55,208.
88
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There is currently in progress a heated debate as to whether advertising
really has a relevant impact on consumer demand and, if it does, whether its
dfect is desirable or undesirable. Professor Galbraith suggests that we have
long since slipped from a free enterprise economy to a "new industrial state"
in which competition is replaced by planning.44 In his scheme, advertising
does not serve the function of promoting products in competitive markets, but
rather of channelling demand to meet pre-planned capacity. While I admit
I am somewhat less frightened by a society conceived and planned by Madison
Avenue than I am by one wholly managed in Washington, I find even the
former frightening enough that I take some pleasure in the fact that I believe
him to be wrong. I believe competition is not dead, though it be moribund,
and that consumers are still not totally the servants of large corporations. I
take some small pride in the demise of the Edsel and am persuaded that studies
like Dr. Backman's in his recent book Advertising and Competition45 support
the idea that advertising still has an effect on competition and that, on oc
casion, the effect is positive rather than negative by helping to establish mass
markets, by making possible methods of national distribution, and more sig
nificantly, by providing necessary information to consumers. Further, the
findings of Professors Bauer and Greyser in their book, Advertising in
America: The Consumer View,46 indicate that an overwhelming majority of
Americans find advertising essential, and a similarly large majority believe
that it helps improve products and raise the standard of living.
Another contribution that the Bauer-Greyser study makes is its refutation
of the opinions of former FCC Commissioner Loevinger who thought that
ads didn't really motivate people to make purchases they didn't want to make
but were actually quite useful because they gave, consumers information not
about the products promoted but about the standard of living to which they
should aspire.47 He went so far as to suggest that the riots in the ghetto were
a direct response to that kind of information.48 The study suggests, to the
contrary, that about two-thirds of the subjects interviewed in depth thought
that advertising leads consumers to make purchases that they really shouldn't
make.49
One may, then, conclude that advertising is not irrelevant to consumer pur
chasing and that competition is not so dead as to be unresponsive to consumer
demand. Neither does it have in many instances the anti-competitive effect of
misinforming consumers so that they make purchases not on the competitive
merits of products but on false merits attributed to them by Madison A venue.
Therefore, consideration must be given to the manner in which the Commis
sion's false advertising policy might deal with the problem. The problem is
.. J.GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
05 J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND CoMPETITION (1967) .
•• R. BAUER & S. GREYSER, ADVE RTISING IN AMERICA: THE CONSUMER VIEW

(1968) .

.. Speech by Commissioner Lee Loevinger, The Power of Advertising, date and place of delivery not
indicated, on file in author's office.
<BId. at 10 .
.,. R. BAUER & S. GREYSER, supra note 46.
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considerably more important than merely whether a few gullible consumers
have been led astray by an over-optimistic product promotion.
First, the Fededral Trade Commission should either provide or insist that
sellers provide intelligent consumers-as well as the gullible and credulous
with basic information. This is a mammoth task. In the past, the Commission
has tended to suppress rather than distribute information. For example, after
an extensive study of analgesics to determine whether comparative claims made
by competing sellers of products were justified, the Commission refused to
publish its results.50 The results indicated that aspirin was as beneficial as
anything else sold. When the Bayer Aspirin Company attempted itself to
publish this study to prove its claim that aspirin was medicinally interchange
able, the Commission, far from applauding, sought an injunction against the
publication of the study.lll It said it feared that the publication of the study
would be interprete<i by credulous consumers as governmental endorsement
of Bayer aspirin. Fortunately, it lost the case.
The Commission could implement a pro-competitive advertising policy
with a number of specific measures. For example, it might move toward the
position that advertising promotion of a product whi.ch does not provide a
rational basis for preferring the product to others is itself an unfair method of
competition. Since such a position is an extreme c.eparture· from present
practice, the Commission might appropriately start with some intermediate
steps pointing in the same direction.
It is probably necessary to be selective in formulating a new pro-competitive
advertising policy not only as to principles to be advanced but also as to
respondents to be charged. No reason appears why a pro-competitive false
advertising policy need apply uniform standards to advertisements irrespective
of the market position of the advertiser. It would seem quite appropriate to
'place a heavier burden of informative advertising or.. those whose products
are found in highly concentrated markets and especialLy those whose products
are among the leaders in that product line. A variab:.e conduct standard de
pending on the market power of the actor certainly has substantial precedential
support in antitrust cases.152 One might further distinguish between advertisers
on the basis of the extent of their advertising. Thus, ::or example, one might
single out such leading companies in the soap, detergent, and cleanser market
as Proctor and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive and Lever Brothers because of the
market position that their products enjoy or because of the heavy advertising
expenditures of the companies. Proctor and Gamble ill 1967 spent 280 million
dollars on advertising; Colgate-Palmolive 105 million; and Lever Brothers
seventy-five million dollars.IiB One might measure c.dvertising expenditures
as a percentage of sales, in which case for the same period, Colgate-Palmolive

_

GO See G. ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION 94-96 (1967).
51FI'C v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aU'd, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
""Levi, A Two Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. V.L. REV. 567 (1952). .
!Il ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 26, 1968, a t 48.
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would be the most appropriate respondent since its advertising expenditures
constituted about twenty-two per cent of its total sales.54

Having identified those companies which have a prominent place in
the hierarchy of a concentrated industry and those with exceptionally high
advertising expenditures in markets that are not vigorously competitive, the
Commission might then reinvoke doctrines developed in earlier cases which,
apparently, it has currently abandoned.
It should first prohibit advertising which suggests that the product promoted
is unique when in fact it is chemically identical, as in the case of chlorine
bleach, or largely interchangeable as in the case of deodorants, soaps, and
analgesics. The prohibition should be applied irrespective of whether the ad
expressly asserts that the product in question is the best or the only product
of its Kind/5 or whether that conclusion is left to infgence. Thus, the promo

tion of a soap with supposedly unique colorful additives, which upon analysis

are found to be merely the traditional soap which has been colored, should be

prohibited.1S6
Similarly, selected companies should be prohibited from establishing straw
men in their advertising against whom they demonstrate a hypothetical
superiority. When Clorox advertises that its bleach is more effective than
weak bleaches, it should not be allowed falsely to create the impression that
the competitive bleaches are weak. Likewise, manufacturers should be pro
hibited from using comparative words, when no comparison is in fact made.
An advertisement stating that a product is better, milder, softer, or cheaper
than an unspecified competitive product or "Brand X," falsely conveys the
impression to consumers that the advertiser's product is actually superior to
the major competitive products. Since this is the message conveyed, it should
be treated as deceptive advertising in the event that it is not a true statement
with respect to the major competitive brands though they remain unnamed.
The Commission once took this position in the Dolcin case,57 and its logic
should be revived.

Also, both tangible and intangible assertions that will be understood as
indicating functional features of a product should be held to a truth standard
on the basis of what is likely to be understood. Thus, it should be equally
objectionable to refer to a floor wax incapable of full effectiveness for a six
month period as "six month floor wax,,,58 and to indicate durability meta
phorically by rolling a sheet of vinyl over the floor and identifying the wax as
capable of providing a similar finish, unless the wax durability is comparable
to that of vinyl sheeting. A claim that a product will cut the time involved
in cleaning· by half should be interdicted if untrue, and similarly, a meta

phoric presentation as by a tornado cleaning dishes in the sink should be held
MId.
M American

Remedy Co., 24 F.T.C. 1128 (1937); Adams Paint Co., 19 F.T.C. 7 (1934) (consent
order); Franklin Paint Co., 16 F.T.C.250 (1932).
.. C/. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
57 Dokin Corp.
, 57 F.T.C. 49 (1961).
Ii8Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.1964).
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violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act under similar circumstances.
An express statement that a child can operate a machine should be required
to meet the truth standard as should the same implicit assertion when an
obviously unintelligent person is shown operating a complicated device with
great relish and skill. Carrying the suggestion one step further, if the name
rejuvenescence cream improperly suggests an impossible rejuvenation,59 ad
vertisements which suggest sexual ecstasies as a result of using after shave
lotions or deodorants should also be prohibited.
Finally, if a seller of magic potions is to be prohibi.ted in the distribution
of those potions irrespective of the fact that people believe in their magical
powers,60 a similar logic would seem to allow the interdiction of those adver
tisements which suggest a magical transformation of a hum-drum life into one
of extreme well-being in connection with the use of the product. I think, in
this respect, of pastoral scenes and nubile maidens cavorting on beaches
pleasant scenes to behold, but suggestive of no rational basis for the preference
of the product. The latter suggestion approaches most closely the initial sug
gestion that a rational basis for product preference should be a sine qua non
of permissible advertising. Unfortunately, however, Commission precedents
would not support interdiction of the metaphoric representations previously
listed. The decisions to date have merely prohibited express statements which
the Commission deems untrue. There seems little reason, however, in per
mitting a statement to be made metaphorically that couLd not be made directly.
If anything, since metaphor is inherently ambiguous and ambigu�ty facilitates
over-interpretation, metaphoric statements ought to be more 'harshly treated
than their literal counterparts. Metaphoric statements carry a far greater
emotional impact than more precise assertions and appears especially suspect
if one views advertising as undesirable when it exceed:; the bounds of provid
ing consumer information.
In addition to a more vigorous pro-competitive advertising policy, the
Commission might reconsider its present reluctance to judge products com
paratively. At the very least, the Commission should allow the defense of the
equivalence of products. Were it willing to look to equivalence, it could then
admit price comparison such as that urged in Mary Carter Paint61 in· which
paint claimed to be equivalent was offered at, effectivdy, half price. As long
as it remains unwilling to test equivalence, the Commission appears bound to
rely solely on historic pricing patterns which are of far less importance to
consumers than information as to the availability of an equivalent product
at a susbtantial price reduction. Not only would the testing of equivalence
have impact in the pricing cases, but it would also serve to stimulate reconsid
eration of the policies governing the use of generic product names, an area
much in need of re-examination.
lID Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F 2d 676 (2d Cir. 19/·4).
"Calvert, 39 P.T.C. 268 (1944) .
.. Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827 (1962), rev'd, 333 F 2d {54 (5th
U.S. 46 (1965), modified order entered, TRADE REG. REP. � 17,660 (F.T.C. 1966).

Cir.
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To suggest that equivalence be examined is not, of course, to request the
Commission to undertake the testing of all consumer products. The issue
need not be raised at all until a seller has been accused of deception in his
advertising. At that point, the Commission should be prepared to accept (as
a defense perhaps) a claim of equivalence and either to obtain expert testimony
or through its own independent testing to judge whether equivalence in fact
exists.
Second, the Commission should at times engage in testing products in
markets in which it has reason to suspect consumer information to be sub
stantially inadequate. Although in the analgesic study mentioned earlier the
Commission did precisely this, its unfortunate decision to supress the informa
tion acquired rendered the study useless for purposes of consumer education.
If such studies are undertaken, their results should be made available to the
public as rapidly as possible, especially when they demonstrate, as did the study
of analgesics, that there is substantial equivalence among a large range of
products, each of which allegedly has a unique function.
Neither of these steps will by themselves create a wholly effective pro
competitive advertising policy but both would serve to initiate a trend against
the present anti-competitive nature of the Commission's advertising policy.
For a Commission charged with preserving both competition and truth in ad
vertising, that appears to be the least one can demand.
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